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REFLECTING ON THE RULE OF LAW, ITS
RECIPROCAL RELATION WITH RIGHTS,
LEGITIMACY AND OTHER CONCEPTS AND
INSTITUTIONS
Samuel J.M. Donnelly*
INTRODUCTION

For many years I have admired my colleague, Dr. Richard
Schwartz, 1 and his project of relating social science to the study of law.
Dr. Richard Schwartz is not only an inspired social scientist but a very
fascinating and friendly partner in deep conversation. After many
discussions, I also admire his project of relating the study of law and
social science to the task of establishing the rule of law and bringing
greater peace and justice to our troubled world. From the perspective of
a lawyer who reflects philosophically on legal decision making and in
celebration of my friend, Dr. Richard Schwartz, I would like to
contribute some modest thoughts to that very important project.
We must recognize, of course, the great progress which has been
made in the establishment of the world rule of law since the important
seventeenth century developments in International Law, which so
fascinate Dr. Schwartz. 2 Since the end of World War II, we have had

* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, LL.B. Harvard University, LL.M.
New York University. Professor Donnelly thanks his research assistant Erik Helbing for his
work on the footnotes. This paper was prepared for a conference on the World Rule of Law
presented at the Syracuse University College of Law to honor Dr. Richard Schwartz on the
occasion of his retirement.
1. Professor Richard Schwartz holds a B.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Yale
University. He is currently the Ernest I. White Research Professor of Law at Syracuse
University College of Law; he additionally is a Professor of Sociology at Syracuse
University. Prior to teaching at Syracuse, Professor Schwartz taught on the law and
sociology faculties at Northwestern and Yale Universities, as well as served as Dean of the
law school at SUNY Buffalo. Professor Schwartz has numerous publications to his credit
including: (1) Natural Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL
SERVICES; (2) Human Rights in an Evolving World Culture, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (A. A. An-Nairn and F.M. Deng, eds., Brookings 1990);
(3) Law and Normative Order, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (L. Lipson and S. Wheeler,
eds., Russell Sage Foundation 1986).
2. See William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11 1h Proposal to
Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 702-03 (2004). Subsequent to the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, secular international law developed. Id. This development is
demonstrated by the treatment of Prisoners of War who became wards of the capturing
sovereign as opposed to prizes of the capturing soldier. Id. Moreover, by the eighteenth
century, Prisoners of War could be confined or sold into slavery, but they were no longer
reflexively put to death. Id.
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one of the great periods in the development of international law and the
global rule of law. 3 The development of the European Union4 and the
progress made under the European Covenant on Human Rights5 has
been particularly remarkable.
When bringing social science to the study of law, understanding
the role of law in the process of social change is central. The great
American example of social change influenced by law begins, of course,
with the end of our Civil War, the freeing of the slaves, and continues
through the establishment of segregation, the attacks upon it,
desegregation and the development of affirmative action.
May I suggest that another very important sequence of legal and
social changes is the development and recognition of human rights in
That momentous
the European Union since · World War · 11. 6
development is worth studying from the perspective of law and social
science. In the first part of the following presentation I would like to
offer some observations on those two examples of law and social
change over a significant period of time. Using those two examples as
illustrations, I want to then reflect from a philosophical perspective on a
series of concepts that I think are important in understanding the role of
law in social change.
In my recent book, A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, 7 I
reflected upon the interrelation between a series of concepts including
the rule of law and its relation to legal protection of rights; the language
and uses of rights; legitimacy; primary social goods, a concept helpful
in understanding rights; horizons; crossing horizons and the use of

3. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signatures Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
4. The European Union was created by a treaty completed in 1992 by Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
253.
5. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention].
6. The European Union, created in 1992, is a relatively new entity. The author does not
wish to suggest human rights advances have not taken place within Europe prior to the
creation of the European Union as demonstrated by the European Convention of Human
Rights in 1950.
7. SAMUEL J. M. DONNELLY, A PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE, THE NEXT STEP: A
PERSON-CENTERED PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Carolina
Academic Press 2003).
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rights to hammer on foreign horizons, or the establishment of rights
across horizons; and analysis of the point of view from which
statements about rights are made.
In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I discuss, among
other matters, how these concepts and their interrelation can be used to
understand and construct a method for judicial decision making. The
same concepts can be used from the perspective or point of view of a
law reform attorney to discuss strategies for law reform. 8 In this paper,
I want to offer those concepts and their interrelation from the
perspective of a legal philosopher and lawyer as a possibly helpful
means for analyzing the gradual establishment internationally and
throughout the world of the rule of law accompanied by the advance of
human and civil rights. Perhaps these ·concepts also may prove helpful
to social scientists as well as legal philosophers in discussing and
understanding the role of law in the process of social change. That
social change may include the gradual establishment of the rule of law
both within individual countries and internationally. Part of my
argument is that advances in the protection of individual rights also
support the developing rule of law and vice versa. I want to organize
that discussion around an analysis of the language and uses of rights
including how rights are used in the process of social change and how
the pursuit of rights relates to establishing the rule of law. What do we
mean, then, by the rule of law? And how is the rule of law related to
legal protection or protection by courts of individual rights? In the
second part I want to address those questions.
Then, in Part III, I should address what we mean by rights. How
do we discern fundamental rights and why should we recognize those
rights? How do rights come to be perceived as legitimate? Legitimacy,
rights and primary social goods is the topic of Part III. Primary social
goods is a concept I have taken from John Rawls and adapted to my
own understanding. Rawls has an important discussion of the relations
between primary social goods and the principles of justice.9
In my understanding, rights always are perceived within horizons
and from a point view. In Part IV, I want to discuss rights, horizons and
point-of-view analysis. In the international sphere, one could argue that
a number of controversies arise because particular rights or questions
concerning the existence of rights are perceived within the horizons of

8. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 283-89.
9. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 396-99, 433-39, 447 (Harvard Univ. Press
1971); see also Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Towards a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic
Insights and Concepts, 28 LoYL.A. L. REV. 547, 587-88 (1995).
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different cultures. An advocate for rights may have to cross or penetrate
foreign horizons in order to persuade persons of another culture to
accept certain rights.
To accomplish law reform, to produce social change, the advance
of rights and the rule of law may require those studying or seeking to
promote those changes to understand horizons and the art of crossing
horizons. Since rights, as I perceive them, always are understood within
a horizon and from a point of view, those promoting or studying social
change, law and rights should strive to understand the use of rights and
the language of rights as tools for crossing horizons, for hammering on
foreign horizons or encouraging others to cross horizons. Rights
traditionally may be understood as remedies offered by law, as
conclusions drawn within a legal system or in more advanced theory as
reasons for decisions, or reasons in the decision making process which
will trump competing reasons. From the perspective of one studying or
promoting law reform, I am suggesting that we understand how rights
are used as tools, as goals to be pursued in the law reform process, as
means for achieving those goals, and as political resources. 10 In Part V
then, I will address the language and uses of rights: rights as tools in the
process of social change.
Finally, I would like to recognize Dr. Schwartz's admiration for
natural law not only for its contributions to the seventeenth century
development of international law but also as a warehouse of resources
for the establishment of the world rule of law and the recognition of
human rights. Using the concepts developed in the previous discussion,
I want to reflect on what we mean by, and how we use, natural law and
how it might contribute to understanding and advancing human rights,
the rule of law and the process of social change, which may lead to their
acceptance.
When reflecting on these topics, I will be commenting from the
perspective of a lawyer and philosopher of law. That precisely is not the
perspective of a social scientist. From my ignorance, I would describe a
social scientist as concerned with description and explanatory theory.
Some explanatory theories are particularly powerful and grand.
Lawyers hardly ever seek explanatory theories of the kind admired by
social scientists and normally do not emphasize description as a primary
task. Lawyers are concerned with decision making and persuading
decision makers. Understanding law from the point of view of the
10. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 254-60; see also SAMUEL J.M. DONNELLY, THE
LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS: A BIOPSY OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 1 (Univ. Press of America 1994).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/3

4

Donnelly: Reflecting On The Rule Of Law, Its Reciprocal Relation With Right

2005]

Rights and the Rule of Law

237

decision maker is central to a lawyer's work and central to legal
philosophy as practiced in America. 11 To the extent that social
scientists and legal philosophers provide lawyers with reflections on
decision making or tools for decision making they may be very helpful
to intelligent practicing attorneys.
I want to take the perspective of one performing that task in the
following discussion. Promoting human rights and establishing the
global rule of law is a task for statesmen and lawyers, as well as an
academic subject to be examined from the perspective of legal
philosophers and social scientists
I. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: GREAT EXAMPLES

To study the promotion of human rights and the establishment of a
world rule of law, we must think about social change both worldwide
and in individual countries. We must also study the role of law in social
change.
A. Brown v. Board ofEducation

The great example, studied by many social scientists, of the
interaction of law and culture resulting, perhaps, in social change are the
legal, political and cultural events and circumstances just ~rior to and
following Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. 2 Actually,
that sequence of legal and cultural changes began almost two centuries
before that great 1954 decision of the Warren Court.
Arbitrarily, I would select 1773 and the equally great decision of
King's Bench in Somersett v. Stewart 13 as the starting point for the
falling dominos that led to the abolishment of slavery, desegregation
and ultimately affirmative action in the United States. In Somersett,
Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice speaking for King's Bench in a
habeas corpus case, freed a black slave, James Somersett, who was
being held at his master's orders on a ship in the Thames for sale in
Jamaica. 14 Mansfield found the return on the writ insufficient since
there were no relevant laws, cases or statutes authorizing slavery in
England. 15 He explained that slavery was too obnoxious to be

11. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 74-83; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
154-55 (Belknap Press 1986).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
14. See EDMUND HEWARD, LORD MANSFIELD 144 (Mary Rose Ltd. London 1979).
15. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1936).
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established by custom. 16 Given the common law doctrine of precedent,
Mansfield in effect abolished slavery in England and freed 14,000 or
15,000 slaves.1 7
A short law reform campaign preceded Somersett, largely
conducted by a London radical, Granville Sharp, who had obtained the
writ of habeas corpus for James Somersett from Lord Mansfield. 18
More significant for the study of law and social change is the gradual
fall of the dominoes after Somersett v. Stewart. That decision made in
1773 before our Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would be
considered binding precedent in most of our American States. 19 Why
then did slavery not immediately fall in the United States? Mansfield's
decision in Somersett turned on the absence of legal authorization,
either statutory or case law, for slavery. A number of our states
particularly in the South had legislation regulating slavery.
Nevertheless, Somersett v. Stewart was an important precedent, which
gave legitimacy to the abolition movement in the United States,
England and the British colonies. 20
Duncan Kennedy describes "legitimacy power" as an important

16. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 269.
17. HEWARD, supra note 14, at 146-47.
18. Id. at 144-45.
19. Available studies strongly suggest that the current consensus that "common law"
was a technical reference to the rules of law and methods of procedure of the three royal
courts at Westminster was not a consensus of 1791 or prior. In 1952, Chafee reviewed the
scope of the unwritten law administered in the thirteen original colonies. He noted at least
four recognized meanings of the phrase "common law:" (1) the systems of law "now
prevalent in the United States and most of the British Commonwealth of Nations" in
contrast with the civil law system "derived from Roman law;" (2) the "law common to all of
England" in contrast with the law of local English jurisdictions; (3) "unwritten law in
contrast with legislation;" and (4) the "law applied in the Courts of Common Pleas, King's
Bench, and Exchequer" in contrast with that "applied in the Court of Chancery." See
Richard E. Coulson, Is Contractual Arbitration an Unconstitutional Waiver of the Right to
Trial by Jury in Oklahoma?, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1991)(citing Chafee,
Colonial Courts and the Common Law, 68 PROCEEDINGS, MASS. HIST. Soc. 132 (1952)),
reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLy AMERICAN LA w 53 (Univ. of North Carolina
Press 1969). Compare Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding
Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 474-75
(2003) (Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Law of England were read
throughout the Atlantic world, maintained that the American colonies were "conquered or
ceded countries" and "therefore the common law of England, as such, has no authority
there; they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions."
He accounted for any resemblance by supposing that the colonists had "copied the spirit of
their own law from the original" and declared that they remained "subject ... to the control
of parliament.").
20. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 267.
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element in social change through law. 21 As our discussion proceeds, we
should pay some attention to the notion and uses of legitimacy power.
In England, shortly after Somersett, Granville Sharpe22 began to
use his newly acquired legitimacy power to attack the slave trade. In
Somersett, Mansfield had been careful to abolish slavery only in
England. He distinguished the slave trade, which was important to the
commerce of England, and did not affect it. Granville Sharpe, however,
persuaded a young member of parliament, who ultimately became Lord
Wilberforce and one of the great figures in the war against Napoleon, to
file a bill abolishing the slave trade. 23 That bill was filed and ignored
each year for twenty years until it was finally passed in 1807, in the
middle of the war against Napoleon. 24 Stopping ships to search for
illegal slaves was probably an aid in the blockade of Napoleonic France.
It has been rightly remarked that an ideal coupled with an interest is a
21. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
22. Granville Sharpe's activities in the English anti-slavery movement predate
Somersett. For example, in 1765 as Granville was visiting his brother William in Mincing
Lane he stumbled upon a poor black man by the name of Jonathan Strong. Strong was the
property of David Lisle, an attorney from Barbados. One day Lisle in a fit of rage beat
Strong over the head with the butt of a pistol, until Strong was almost blind. Because, a
blind slave is of no value to his master, Lisle turned Strong onto the streets to die.
Thereupon the Sharpe brother arranged for Strong's admittance to a local hospital, where he
remained for four months. See HEWARD, supra note 14, at 140-42.
After his recovery Strong secured employment as an errand boy for an apothecary. One
day by accident, Strong ran into his former master, who upon seeing Strong was of some
value, sold Strong to James Kerr. Kerr arranges to kidnap Strong and have him imprisoned
at Poultry Counter Prison, while he awaits a ship to transport Strong to the Indies. At this
point Granville appears before Sir Robert Kite, Lord Mayor, to complain that Strong is
imprisoned without a warrant. Kerr produced the bill of sale, and the Lord Mayor declared
Strong to be the property of Kerr. Nevertheless, the Lord Mayor rules that not even a slave
can be imprisoned without a warrant, and thus allowed Strong to walk out of the courtroom.
Kerr proceeded to sue Granville for £200 for deprivation of property. These charges were
later dropped. Id.
23. William Lord Wilberforce (1759-1833) was educated at the University of
Cambridge. Lord Wilberforce was elected to Parliament in 1780, and embraced Evangelical
Christianity in 1784. Lord Wilberforce emerged as the abolitionist movement in the House
of Commons. In 1807, Lord Wilberforce secured enactment of a bill prohibiting the slave
trade. In 1823, Lord Wilberforce was a founding member of the Anti-Slavery Society. In
1825 because of poor health, Lord Wilberforce was forced to resign from the House of
Commons. The bill abolishing slavery passed one month after Lord Wilberforce's death.
See 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 300-01 (1986).
24. In the United States, the slave trade could not be prohibited until 1808. See U.S.
CONST. art. I§ 9 cl. 1. In 1807 Congress passed an act to abolish the slave trade (but not the
institution of slavery) on January 1, 1808. See An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves
Into Any Port or Place Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, From and After the First
Day of January, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eight, ch. XXII
3 Stat. 426-30 ( 1807).
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powerful political force.
The slave trade was effectively brought to a halt after England, and
the United States agreed in the 1840's to joint patrolling of the coast of
Africa by the British and American fleets. 25 At that time, England was
attempting to obtain toeholds on the coast of Africa. Again, we see the
power of an ideal coupled with an interest.
In between those events at the Congress of Vienna, at the close of
Napoleon's wars, the great powers of Europe agreed to the abolishment
of the slave trade. 26 Participation in the slave trade was thereafter added
to piracy as a crime of international Jurisdiction, crimes which could be
prosecuted and tried by any nation. 2 Please observe the gradual social
change influenced by law leading towards the establishment of human
rights and the rule of law. And note the importance of legitimacy power
in that process.
The dominoes, of course, fell dramatically thereafter, first in the
Caribbean, 28 then the American South, 29 and ultimately in Brazil. 30 The

25. See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 572.
26. At the advent of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 800 petitions were presented to
the British House of Commons to stop the international slave trade, this public pressure
spurred the British government to press for action at Vienna. See Steve Charnovitz, Two
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183,
192 (1997). However, the only agreement that could be achieved was a declaration
condemning the slave trade. See Declaration of Eight Courts Relative to the Universal
Abolition of the Slave Trade, Feb. 8, 1815, 63 Consol. T.S. 473. Nevertheless, numerous
treaties were signed between individual nations concerning the slave trade. See, e.g., Treaty
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Sept. 23, 1817, Gr. Brit.-Spain, 68 Consol. T.S. 45;
Treaty at The Hague, May 4, 1818, Gr. Brit.-Neth., 68 Consol. T.S. 403; Declaration
Respecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Nov. 28, 1822, Aus.-Fr.-Gr. Brit-Prussia-Russ,
73 Consol. T.S. 31; Slave Treaty, Nov. 6, 1824, Gr. Brit.-Swed.-Neth., 75 Consol. T.S. 1.
27. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 13, 13 U.S.T. 2376, 450
U.N.T.S. 90; RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONS § 404 (1987).
28. In 1791 the Blacks in Haiti entered into a full-fledged rebellion that would result in
the creation of the State of Haiti and the abolition of slavery. In 1801 Toussaint Louventure
proclaimed himself governor of St. Domingue (Haiti), and a constitution was passed
abolishing slavery. In 1802 the French arrested and exiled Louventure to France where he
died a year later. The Haitians then purchased their independence from France. After the
assassination of Emperor Dessalines in 1806 the country split in half. In 1822 Jean Pierre
Boyer invaded the eastern part of the island, unified the island, and abolished slavery. See
Synopsis
of
Haitian
History,
available
at
http://www.discoverhaiti.com/history_summary.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1.
30. Slavery was abolished in Brazil in several stages. In 1871 the "Law of the Free
Womb" freed all children born of a slave, but the master retain labor rights until the child
reached the age of twenty-one. In 1885 the law freed all slaves over the age of 60. In 1888
the "Golden Law" freed all remaining slaves without compensation to the owner. See From
Slavery
to
Abolition
in
Nineteenth
Century
Brazil,
at
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-caguirre/381_14.html (last visited, Apr. 29, 2005).
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great drama, culminating in the abolishment of slavery, came to an end.
But then a new episode, a sequel, began as the American South
replaced slavery with segregation throu~h a long series of struggles
culminating legally in Plessy v. Ferguson. 1
Following Plessy, a new era of law reform began, not unrelated to
Somersett v. Stewarr 2 and the abolishment of slavery. The great law
reform campaign organized by the NAACP beginning in 1929
gradually, case by case, established legitimacy power for
desegregation. 33 The work of their lawyers, however, was not the only
force leading in 1954 to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas. 34
Arguably the era of law which William Wiecek describes as legal
classicism came to an end with Franklin Roosevelt's appointments to
the United States Supreme Court in the late 1930's.35 At the time of
Brown v. Board of Education, many of the Roosevelt appointees were
still serving on the Court. 36 In my book, A Personalist Jurisprudence,
The Next Step, I describe some of the forces leading to Brown as
follows:
The period between 1937 and 1954 was a tumultuous
time including the end of the Great Depression, the Second
World War, the Holocaust, the Korean War and the
beginning of the Cold War confrontation with Russia.
Arguably these experiences changed our national outlook
and understanding. On racial questions, the experience of
Americans in the armed forces, Truman's desegregation of
the military and the shock of the Holocaust prepared our

31. 63 U.S. 537 (1896).
32. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
33. See, e.g., Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri must offer AfricanAmericans substantially equal legal education, effectively requiring Missouri to admit
African-Americans to a white school); see also Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma,
332 U.S. 631 (1948) (State law schools cannot discriminate against African-Americans);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Union representatives under
the Federal Railway Act cannot discriminate in representation of members on the basis of
race); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Racial restrictive covenants in private housing
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
36. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144. The Roosevelt appointees to the Court at the
time Brown was decided were in order of appointment: Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix
Frankfurter, William Douglas, and Robert Jackson. Id.
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national culture for a changed position on race. Legally the
demise of legal classicism and the advance of pragmatic
instrumentalist thought was helpful. The great law reform
campaign conducted by lawyers for the NAACP be.finning
in 1929 had established a series of useful precedent. 3
The process of social change leading to and following from Brown
has been the subject of many social science studies. 38 Controversially,
the Brown Court relied on social science studies including Gunnar
Myrdal's An American Dilemma, in support of its decision. 39 In
contrast, the quality of the reasoning process in Brown has been the
subject of many competing works of legal philosophy. The quarrels
over Brown may be the heart of what I describe as the modern great
quarrel over method. 40
From the perspective of a legal philosopher questions such as how
should Chief Justice Warren have justified his decision in Brown, and is
the decision justifiable, are the fascinating questions. From the
perspective of a law reformer, examining the strategies of the NAACP
and Thurgood Marshall is an important study. 41 A very helpful work of
social science derived from the effort is Stuart Scheingold, The Politics
of Rights. 42 What I am suggesting is that social scientists who want to
contribute to the advance of human rights follow the example of
Scheingold. Legal philosophers creating or criticizing decision making
methods should struggle to understand the relation between social
forces and the work of decision makers.

37. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144-45.
38. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 4-6 (Yale Univ. Press 1974).
39. The studies relied on by the Court to assess the effect of school segregation include
inter alia: "[1] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); [2]
Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; [3] Deutscher and Chein,
The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26
J .PSYCHOL. 259 ( 1948); [4] Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under
Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); [5]
Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (Maciver, ed., 1949),
44--48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11 (italics added).
40. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 153.
41. See id. at 283-89.
42. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38.
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B. European Human Rights

On October 29, 2004, the members of the European Union took a
further major step towards advancing human rights and the rule of law
on their continent. They signed a Constitution for the European
Union. 43 The new Constitution contained a list of fundamental rights:
life, integrity of the person, marriage, freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, expression and assembly, education, work, asylum, equality,
equality between men and women, social security, health care,
environmental and consumer protection, petition, fair trial and
presumption of innocence. 44
The signing of the new Constitution is the latest in a long series of
events starting after the Second World War with establishment of the
United Nations. The 1945 U.N. Charter, in Article 55, authorized the
United Nations to "promote ... universal respect for and observance of
human rights. "45 In 1946, the Commission on Human Rights was
created under Article 68 of the U.N. Charter46 to draft human rights
treaties implementing Article 55. In 1948, the General Assembly
contributed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a means for
defining the rights to be promoted and respected under Article 55 of the
U.N. Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights47 was not a
treaty and not legally binding on member States. 48 However, two basic
treaties were adopted in 1966 and offered for ratification to member
States, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights49 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 50

43. See Graham Bowley, Heads of State Sign the European Union's First Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A3.
44. See generally Treaty Establishing A Constitution For Europe, CIG 87/04 (Aug. 6,
2004).
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c.
46. Article 68 of the U.N. Charter provides "The Economic and Social Council shall set
up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and
such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions." Id. at art.
68.
47. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. N1810 (1948).
48. Article 11 of the United Nations Charter mandates that any matter brought before it
where action is necessary must be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 2; see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 110 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th
ed. Oxford Press 1963) (resolutions passed by the United Nation's General Assembly are
not binding on member states).
49. ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
50. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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In the meantime, the Council of Europe, which was created in
1949, during 1950 offered its member States the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 51
which became effective after ratification in 1953. This treaty has been
ratified by all the members of the Council of Europe. The European
Convention on Human Rights initially was enforced by the European
Commission on Human Rights. Cases which could not be settled by the
persuasive power of the European Commission on Human Rights would
be referred to the Council of Europe's committee of ministers.
Alternatively, member States or the Commission could refer cases to the
European Court of Human Rights whose decisions would be enforced
by the Commission on Human Rights. 52
A new and more powerful European Court of Human Rights was
established in November 1998. 53 Now, individuals with human rights
complaints may proceed directly in the Court of Human Rights. One
should note, of course, that the Council of Europe should be
distinguished from the European Union and the Court of Human Rights
from the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The European Convention on Human Rights has had wide impact
on the advance of human rights in Europe. That influence was
summarized in 1994 as follows:
In Austria where the Convention has the rank of

51. European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
52. Prior to the adoption of Protocol 11 in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights
operated as follows: (1) The European Commission on Human Rights considered the
admissibly of the case. (2) If the case was admissible, the Commission determined the facts
and attempted to secure a friendly settlement. (3) The Commission prepared a report
regarding unsettled cases, including a finding of facts and its opinion with regard to
violations. This report went to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
During the next three months the Committee, Commission, or any interested state party
could refer the case to the Court. N.B. individual claims came before the court only through
the Commission because only states and the Commissions could bring cases to the Court.
Since the adoption of Protocol 11 in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights hears all
cases alleging violations of individual rights, the function of the Commission and the
Commission itself has been terminated. See LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 57-58 (West Group 2003).
53. Prior to 1998 the Committee of Ministers was an alternative to the European Court
of Human Rights as a body for determining breaches of the European Covenant of Human
Rights. In 1998 the State members of the Council of Europe decided in Protocol 11 to the
European Covenant of Human Rights to abolish this role. As such, the European Court of
Human Rights is currently the only body competent to determine breaches of the European
Covenant on Human Rights. See Robin R. Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, The Collective
Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring
Compliance with Economic and Social Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 417, 455 (2004).
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constitutional law, the Code of Criminal Procedures has had
to be modified as a result of case-law in Strasbourg; so too
the system of legal aid fees for lawyers. In Belgium,
amendments have been made to the Penal Code, its
vagrancy legislations and its Civil Code to insure equal
rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. In Germany
modifications that bring legislation better into line with the
Convention's provisions have also been made ...
In the Netherlands where most of the Convention's selfexecuting substantive provisions are endowed with a
hierarchically superior status to the Constitution itself,
changes have been made in the Military Criminal Code and
the law on detention of mental patients. In Ireland, court
proceedings have been simplified and civil legal aid and
advice schemes set up ...
In France, the law relating to the secrecy of telephone
communications had to be altered, while in Italy a new
Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted to change the law
concerning regulation of detention on remand ... 54
Great Britain is the member of the Council of Europe who has been
most frequently before the European Court of Human Rights. 55 For a
number of years the United Kingdom, where the Queen in Parliament is
sovereign and where there is no written constitution, did not include the
European Convention on Human Rights in its domestic law. Now,
however, Parliament has enacted the Convention on Human Rights as
part of British domestic law thereby making human rights litigation and
law reform campaigns possible in England.
This gradual expansion and acceptance of a European regime of
rights of course, was influenced by the Second World War, the
Holocaust, and the Cold War. If one compares the legal, political and
cultural circumstances in Europe today with those in 1935, 1945 and
1965 one should notice remarkable changes influenced by the legal
developments just described.

54. Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principle Characteristics of the
New ECHR Control Mechanism, As Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed on 11 May
1994: A Single European Court ofHuman Rights is to Replace the Existing and Commission
and Court in Strasbourg, 15 HUM. RTS. L. J. 81, 82-83 (1994).
55. MALONE, supra note 52, at 58 (explaining that unlike most countries in Europe the
United Kingdom has no constitution or domestic guarantee of individual rights, therefore
individuals are forced to use this court in protecting their individual rights).
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II. THE RULE OF LAW
The English speaking countries of the world are renowned citadels
of the rule of law. Historically, a State monopoly for the use of violence
is central to the rule of law. If the State cannot provide security for its
citizens against private violence then it looses legitimacy. From the
time of the conquest, English kings put a strong emphasis on the
suppression and control of private violence and we in America have
followed their example. In the English speaking countries, however, the
rule of law has a long standing association with the protection of civil
liberties. An interesting question is why the protection of civil liberties
should be associated historically with the advance of the rule of law.
A possible answer is that in our understanding the rule of law
governs those in authority as well as members of the public. Under the
rule of law citizens should be protected by law against their government
as well as against private violence. The courts are the traditional
instrument in the English speaking countries for securing that
protection.
The courts have another important role in maintaining the rule of
law. Instead of fighting in the streets, instead of resorting to private
violence disputants are encouraged to take their cases to court and abide
by the result. In Somersett v. Stewart, 56 which ended slavery in
England, Granville Sharp, the London radical, served the writ of habeas
corpus issued by Lord Mansfield on Captain Knowles who was holding
the slave James Somersett on his ship in the Thames. 57 Instead of
raising his sails and sailing to Jamaica Captain Knowles appeared in
court and made a response to the writ. 58 I describe Captain Knowles as
the law abiding ship captain.
Because people bring their disputes to court and abide by the
result, courts have power, are able to maintain the rule of law and can
advance civil liberties. From the experience of the English speaking
countries and other parts of our world we can develop some suggestions
which are not particularly original for advancing the world rule of law.

A. The Control ofPrivate Violence
The advance of the rule of law within a particular country depends
on providing security, on effectively controlling private violence. On
the world stage the United Nations, the Security Council or some

56. 98 Eng. Rep. 499.
57. See HEWARD, supra note 14, at 144.
58. Id.
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similar institution must have the authority to authorize the international
use of violence by one country against another. 59 International violence
without authorization should become illegal. 60 International law is
moving in that direction, but has not yet established central control of
international violence.
B. The Role of Courts
Historically, courts have two important roles in maintaining the
rule of law: (1) protecting civil liberties by subjecting government
officials to the rule of law, and (2) contributing to the control of private
violence by encouraging disputants to bring their disputes to court and
abide by the result. The two roles are not unconnected.
In any particular country, encouraging the citizens to bring their
disputes to court rather than fighting in the streets would be a positive
contribution to the rule of law and would lay a foundation for courts to
assist in the protection and advance of civil liberties.
Internationally, we are making some progress in the establishment
of courts to which countries and their citizens can bring their disputes.
The progress in particular regions of the world is more remarkable.
Most remarkable is the growing power of the courts of the European
Community. In Europe, the European Covenant on Human Rights, the
work of the European Court of Human Rights, and the gradual inclusion
of the covenant in the domestic law of the European states is dramatic
progress, although progress that was made gradually.

C. Gradual Progress Can Be Made Towards Establishing the
International Rule of Law in Several Ways.
Using European developments as a model, regional courts can be

59. In the current state of affairs the ability of members of an international organization
to set aside their personal bias is questionable. For example, when the United States
brought a motion before the U.N. Security Council to enforce the cease fire agreed to by
Iraq in 1991, several nations vetoed it. It later came to light that these nations (France,
Russia, and China) were receiving kickbacks from the oil for food program, and as such had
incentive not to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power.
60. There have been several attempts throughout history to outlaw war. See, e.g.,
Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 28,
1929, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; see U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 1, which provides in
pertinent part: ("To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace.").
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established. Within countries international investment and commercial
activity will be advanced by growing acceptance of the rule of law and
by the availability of courts which will resolve commercial disputes. 61
International commercial treaties, arbitration and the availability of
courts for dispute settlement gradually will accustom disputants to
taking their disputes to court and abiding by the results. 62
D. There Is a Close Connection Between the Function of Courts In
Protecting the Rights of Citizens Against Their Governments and the
Establishment of The Rule ofLaw.
The rule of law, as we understand it, requires that government
officials be governed by law. When courts enforce that, the confidence
of citizens in the courts and their willingness to bring their disputes to
court should increase, thereby reducing at least the major incidents of
private violence. Surely, the series of propositions I just offered can be
transformed into hypotheses, which can be studied using the tools of
social science. 63
III. LEGITIMACY, RIGHTS AND PRIMARY SOCIAL GOODS
Legitimacy power, according to Duncan Kennedy, is enhanced
when a judge decides an important pace-making case, a significant step
in law reform, while offering good legal arguments in his opinion in
support of the decision. 64 Changes or developments in law or legal
institutions can enhance the legitimacy power of the courts or society or
they can produce legitimacy costs. 65 Ultimately, Brown v. Board of
Education 66 enhanced the legitimacy power and the historical reputation
of the Warren Court. The decision itself is one of the great historic
achievements of our court system. It has a quality, which I describe as
ultimate legitimacy. Nevertheless, in its immediate aftermath and over
the years, the Brown decision produced legitimacy costs. 67

61. For example (1) The London Court oflnternational Arbitration; (2) European Court
of Arbitration; (3) The Permanent Court of Arbitration.
62. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 62.
63. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL AND JULIAN c. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASIEXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (Houghton Mifflin 1963). Quasi-experimentation
constitutes a class of empirical studies that lack two of the usual features of
experimentation: (1) the lack of full control, and (2) absence ofrandomization. Id.
64. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 527-28.
65. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 10.
66. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
67. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 150 (a decision is supported by ultimate legitimacy
if it is by reasons that have the possibility of being acceptable to all persons at all times
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Legitimacy power can accumulate slowly case by case during a
sequence of law reform or over the history of an institution. A judge
who renders a series of important decisions supported by good legal
argument grows in legitimacy power. 68 As an example, consider Judge
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo and such decisions as MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. 69 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. 7 Consider as a
second example the growing legitimacy power of the institutions of the
European Union.
Various authors offer differing theories of legitimacy. In my book,
A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I compare, for example, the
differing views on legitimacy of Cass Sunstein71 and Ronald Dworkin. 72
One can derive insights re~arding legitimac~ from the now ancient
quarrel between H.L.A. Hart 3 and Lon Fuller. 4 Hart understood law as
a system of rules accepted by the people and spent considerable time
explaining what he meant by acceptance. Lon Fuller was more
concerned with the circumstances and conditions which would enhance
the acceptability of law and make it more likely that it would be
acceptable. An inquiry using the tools of social science into the
qualities which make law or changes in law more likely to be acceptable
would seem to advance our understanding of how to promote the rule of
law and the advance of human rights.
Dworkin contends that the legitimacy, and I would say the
acceptability of law, is grounded "not in the hard terrain of contracts or
duties of justice or obligations of fair play that might hold among
strangers, where philosophers have hoped to find it, but in the more

°

because they are based on respect and concern for each person.) N.B. all persons need not
accept the reasoning the mere possibility of acceptance by all suffices.
68. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 527-28.
69. 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916).
70. 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928).
71. See DONNELLy' supra note 7' at 39 (discussing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 53 (Oxford Univ.Press 1996)). Sunstein argues:
"Legitimacy stems not simply from principled consistency on the part of the adjudicators,
but from a justifiable exercise of authority, which requires a theory of just institutions. That
theory should in turn be founded in democratic considerations suitably constrained by an
account of what interests should be immunized from democratic intrusions. Legitimacy is
an outcome of well-functioning democratic processes, not of a system of distinction-making
undertaken by judges. Even if done exceptionally well, distinction-making by principled
judges is too court-centered as a source oflegitimacy." Id.
72. See DWORKIN, supra note 11.
73. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Laws and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
74. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958).
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fertile ground of fraternity, community and their attendant
obligations."75 Dworkin argues that "[p]olitical association, like family
and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate is
itself pregnant of obligation. " 76 Dworkin' s understanding of legitimacy
then resembles his theory of political friendship.
Political friendship, as a grounding for the legitimacy and
acceptability of law and society's institutions, would seem to present
both problems and opportunities for furthering the global rule of law. A
new institution, an international court, for example, does not fit easily
into the existing pattern of political friendships and interactions.
However, as human interactions slowly grow around that new
institution it will become more acceptable. Witness the growth in
authority and legitimacy of the European courts. Those activities may
be the normal interactions of people who move from country to country.
In our world today commercial activities will be an important element
of those interactions which lead to political friendships.
Personalist theory, as I describe it in my book, A Personalist
Jurisprudence, The Next Step, offers a foundation for political
friendship in the perception that persons are interrelated, that we are
more fully persons when in relation with other persons. 77 At the
foundation of personalist theory is the perception of a necessary
interrelationship between persons and a commitment to afford each
person deep respect and concern. 78 That perception and that
commitment provide a basis for personalist acceptance of Dworkin' s
theory of political friendship. 79 Political friendship as understood in
view of that perception and commitment then leads to a theory of rights,
obligations and legitimacy.
In personalist theory, one has an obligation to
cooperate in building and maintaining the reasonable
institutions of the society in which he finds himself, that is
because one has a duty of respect and concern for the
persons with whom one inevitably is engaged in interaction.
75.

DWORKIN,

supra note 11, at 206.

76. Id.

77. The personalist ideal, "is a universal community of persons in which each cares for
all other" because "the self-realization of any individual is only fully achieved if he is
positively motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation." See
DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 99-100 (quoting JOHN MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION
159 (Faber London 1970)).
78. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 88.
79. Id.
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One interacts with others through language, through the
circumstances of daily living, through all the ways in which
one exists in modem society. One understands himself as a
person through that interaction with other persons whom
one perceives in the course of action as persons. 80
The theory of rights like the theory of political obligations arises
from that perception of persons acting together in society and hence
growing more fully as persons. Each person under personalist theory
has a right to participate in the common action of society and a right to
the means necessary for that participation. 81
The means necessary for participation in the common action of
society could be described as the primary social goods. The primary
social goods are those necessary or important both generally and in any
particular society for participation in the common action of that
society. 82 The concept, primary social goods, is borrowed from John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice and slightly transformed. Rawls would
define the primary social goods as those necessary to pursuing any
rational plan in life. In Rawls' theory the principles of justice derived in
his Original Position are those which will assure all parties the best
chance of maximizing their share of the primary social goods on lifting
of the veil of ignorance and the best chance of minimizing disastrous
losses of the primary social goods.
In Eersonalist theory without the crutch or aid of the Original
Position 3 and the Veil of Ignorance, 84 the primary social goods
nevertheless are very helpful in constructing a theory of rights. Basic
80. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 241.
81. Id. at 296.
82. See id. at 101.
83. See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 118. The original position is a model to help man
detennine what is just or unjust. In this model there are numerous pieces of a game that
make decisions that affect society as a whole. While making these decisions it is assumed
that the parties will make decisions that tend to maximize the potential good they can
experience, while at the same time minimize the potential hann they can suffer. After the
pieces of the game make their decisions the ultimate decision maker, i.e., the player of the
game, makes the ultimate decision if a proposed rule of law is just.
84. Somehow we must "nullify the effects of specific contingencies, of the pieces in the
original position that put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantages." In order to accomplish this goal Rawls assumes
the pieces are situated under a veil of ignorance. While under the veil the pieces do not
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged
to evaluate the principles solely on the basis of general consideration. Furthennore, while
under the veil the pieces do not know inter alia: (1) their place in society; (2) class; (3)
social status; (4) fortune; (5) intelligence; or (6) strength. Id. at 136-37.
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rights are those designed to protect the primary social goods. A number
of these rights would be found in our United States Constitution and
some in the rest of our law. 85 In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next
Step, I argue:
Respect, then, for each person's right to participate in
the intersubjectivity or political friendship of the common
action, the life of the community becomes the basis for the
primary rights. Primary rights are those which would
protect against deprivation of the personal, economic, and
political goods necessary to basic participation in ant
society's and in this particularly society's common action. 8
In personalist theory, the understanding of legitimacy is grounded
in political friendship, respect and concern for each person, persons
interacting in the common action and their right to the primary social
Legitimacy in
goods necessary to continue that participation. 87
personalist thought then shares a common grounding with the theories
of rights and obligations.
In A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I argue that "[a]
society is legitimate to the extent that it strives to advance and protect
everyone's and each one's share of the primary social goods." 88
Particular institutions and activities of society are legitimate insofar as
they share or participate in society's mission of enhancing the common
action, affording respect and concern for each person and protecting and
improving each person's share of the primary social goods, that is, each
person's opportunity to participate in the common action of society. 89
For example, the judicial system is legitimate because by
reasonable settlement of disputes it advances and maintains the rule of
law. 90 Members of society are encouraged by the possibility of
reasonable settlement of disputes to bring their cases to court rather than

85. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VI, VIII, XIV (Freedom of Speech and Press
(Amendment 1); due process of law (Amendments 5 and 14); trial by jury and confrontation
of witnesses (Amendment 6); and prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment
(Amendment 8).
86. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 107-08 (quoting Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Towards
a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic Insights and Concepts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 547, 589
(1995)).
87. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 75.
88. See id. at 241.
89. Id. at 239-46.
90. Id. at 240.
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fight out the disputes in the streets. If they can obtain fair results in
challenges through judicial proceedings against government officials
that will advance the rule of law and reduce incentives to violence.
Maintaining the rule of law in this manner, a principal mission of the
courts, advances everyone's share of the primary social goods and
opportunity to participate in society.
I have just offered then a set of interrelated concepts and perhaps
theories, understandings of rights, obligations, legitimacy and the
primary social goods all grounded in respect and concern for each
individual and each person's interaction with others in the common
action of society.
A question then proposed is whether those concepts are helpful in
studying or practically advancing human rights and the rule of law both
internationally and in particular countries. For example, if one is
attempting to establish a stable and legitimate government in a
"disorderly" comer of the world, a series of concrete steps would be
sponsored by the theories just advanced:
First, in order to maintain the rule of law, the government must
substantially suppress private violence. By providing that security to
society most citizens share of the primary social goods will be enhanced
thereby advancing the legitimacy of the government.
Second, at a reasonably early stage there should be a court system,
which will entertain private actions. Members of society hopefully will
bring their disputes to court rather than fight in the streets. By this
means, private violence will be reduced further, primary social goods
will be protected and the legitimacy of society advanced.
Third, government members should be subject to the rule of law
thereby advancing the protection of rights, the rule of law, and
everyone's share of the primary social goods. For those reasons, the
new government will be perceived more clearly as legitimate.
Fourth, basic human rights or some of them should be protected by
the government producing similar results.
Now, adapt that set of steps to the establishment of a regional
union, for example, the European Union. The victory of the Allies
during World War II and the eventual demise of the Cold War
established internationally within Europe a reduction and control of
violence followed by treaties codifying that elimination of violence. 91

91. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Alb.-Bulg.-Hung.-F.R.G.-Rom.-U.S.S.R.Czech Rep., May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3.

Published by SURFACE, 2005

21

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 3

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

254

[Vol. 32:233

The European Covenant on Human Rights92 and a court designed to
enforce that covenant93 were established. The Court of the European
Communities94 as well as the Court of Human Rights 95 provided forums
for the settlement of disputes. We have witnessed a gradual advance in
the stability of Europe and the legitimacy of the European Union. 96
What I am offering, of course, are some interrelated concepts
which may be helpful in understanding the advance of the rule of law
and the related promotion of human rights. Social scientists must tell
whether they can make use of these concepts and practitioners will
discover whether they are useful as a basis for refining their tools.
Ultimately the test of this pudding will be in the eating.
Some of the obstacles to the further development of the
international rule of law and the advance of human rights perhaps may
be captured in some further but related concepts. In the next part, I
want to discuss the problem of horizons and the various points of view
from which rights are perceived.
IV. THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS: RIGHTS AS TOOLS IN THE
PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
A great obstacle to the advance of human rights and to the
establishment in the international sphere of the rule of law is the
phenomenon I refer to as horizons. This is a familiar phenomenon. In
international human rights discourse, one regularly encounters the
discussion of whether economic rights are more important than civil

92.
93.
94.
87/04.
95.
96.

See generally European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Id. at art. 19 (creating the European Court of Human Rights).
See Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Aug. 6, 004,

art.

1-29

CIG

European Convention, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 19.
Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (a decision by
the Congress of the European Movement in May 1948 created the Council of Europe); see
also Andrea Schultz, The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the European
See

Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 355, 357 (2002)

(within the framework of the Council of Europe certain organizations were created having
authority to control the application of the Statute viz. The European Commission of Human
rights in 1954 and The European Court ' of Human Rights in 1959 ("These Council of
Europe organs are not to be confused with the European Commission, i.e., the executive of
the European Union and with the European Court of Justice")). Id. at n. 8.
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liberties or vice versa. 97 Not surprisingly, the priority for economic
rights is favored in some developing countries with strong or dictatorial
central regimes while thinkers like John Rawls, writing in democratic
countries, would favor a priority for civil liberties. 98 Likewise, rights
considered basic and important in European and Western circles are
questioned in the Middle East. 99
In my book, A Personalist Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I argue
that every statement concerning rights is made within a horizon and
from a point of view. 100 I would like to begin this part of the discussion
by elucidating that argument and by explaining the terms horizon and
point of view.
The term "horizon" is used by philosophers such as Bernard
Lonergan, 101 Martin Heidegger 102 and Hans Georg Gadamer 103 as a
metaphor to discuss "the normal human condition of having limited
knowledge and understanding." Literally, horizon refers to the line at
the edge of the sky and earth which marks the limits of our physical
vision. We all know that there are mountains, valleys, cities and lakes
beyond the circular line of the horizon and hence beyond our physical
vision. A valuable aspect of the metaphor is that we also know that we
can cross beyond our present physical horizons and find those cities and

97. It has been argued that Asian Countries disagree with the theory of individual
human rights the West uses, instead arguing the principle need in Asia is economic
development contrary to the importance the West places on civil and political rights.
Moreover in Asia social and economic rights are more important and will receive a higher
priority. See, e.g., Bina D'Costa, Challenges for an Independent Asian Human Rights
Commission ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615 (1998); see also RAWLS, supra note 9, at 53
(Lexical priority of principle of equal liberty or over the second property of fair
distribution).
98. See Robert Burns, Law and Social Theory: Rawls and the Principles of Welfare
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 184, n. 35 (1988) referring to RAWLS, supra note 9, at 60-90 ("One
may compare Rawl' s exposition of the varying degrees of equality required in political and
civil rights as opposed to social and economic rights.").
99. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 51 (Auth. Ed.) ("Many
Americans have wondered, 'Why do they hate us?' some also ask 'What can we do to stop
these attacks?' Bin Laden and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions. To the
first, they say ... America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. [T]o the
second question ... America should abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the
immorality and godlessness of its society and culture." Id.
100. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 260.
101. See BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 235-36 (2d ed.) (1970).
102. See MARTIN M. HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 34-35 (J. Stamburgh trans.
1969).
103. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 303, 306-07 (Joel Weinsheimer
& Donald G. Marshall, trans., 1975).
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mountains. I can leave this university, hop into my car and drive to
Skaneateles Lake. If I do, my whole view, my physical scenery and my
emotional mood, will change.
Likewise, we can cross our intellectual and cultural horizons. I can
leave the law school and cross the parking lot to the Maxwell School of
Citizenship where I can study economics, history or sociology, thereby
changing my intellectual outlook and vision.
Horizons, both physical and intellectual, create and also confine
vision. I can see to the edge of the horizon to the limits of my current
knowledge and interest, but not beyond.
By crossing horizons
physically and intellectually, I can expand my vision. Fascinatingly,
however, when I cross horizons I find myself in a new horizon which
also creates and confines vision. When I leave college with a degree in
economics, sociology or history and enter law school I find new vision
but gradually forget and loose interest in the social sciences.
Horizons affect our understanding of rights. A philosopher and a
lawyer will discuss rights differently as will persons brought up in
various cultures. Representatives from the Near East, for example,
regularly tell us that our Western understanding of rights does not make
sense in their cultures. A familiar phenomenon, however, is that a
person returning to the East from an education in Paris or Boston may
tum out to be an advocate for a more western understanding of rights in
his or her home country and culture. 104 Sometimes what Hans-Georg
Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons takes place. 105
To understand statements regarding rights, I often argue, one must
recognize that every rights statement is made within a horizon and from
a point of view. A district attorney talking about rights, perhaps the
rights of a victim, is speaking from a different point of view and perhaps
with a different meaning than a defense attorney. The judge's point of
view is yet different. Social scientists and some legal philosophers
could talk about rights from a descriptive point of view. That very
definitely is not the point of view of a law reform attorney campaigning
for the establishment of new rights. 106 That would not have been the
point of view of Thurgood Marshall during the long campaign leading
to Brown v. Board ofEducation. 107
A law reformer such as Thurgood Marshall or Granville Sharpe

104.
105.
106.
107.

Such an example is the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi.
note 103, at 306-07.
See Donnelly, supra note 7, at 283-89.
347 U.S. 483.

HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, supra
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following Somersett v. Stewart, 108 would not perceive rights
descriptively, or as entitlements, or as conclusions to be drawn within a
system of law. Probably he would find Llewellyn's Holmesian
understanding of rights as predictions that a court would afford a
remedy only moderately helpful. 109 Rather he would perceive rights as
goals to be pursued and great decisions such as Somersett v. Stewart or
Brown v. Board of Education not only as important victories but also as
resources for further pursuit of the goal of complete abolishment of
slavery and the slave trade or of desegregation. As Stuart Scheingold
points out, the legitimacy power of a great victofl becomes a resource
for the next battle in the further pursuit of rights. 11
Likewise, from the point of view of a judge, that is, the point of
view of one concerned with action, with deciding a case, rights are not
predictions of what a court will in fact do. The point of view of a judge
is neither a descriptive nor a predictive point of view. According to
H.L.A. Hart, a judge may perceive rights as conclusions to be drawn in
a system of rules. 111 Or he may perceive the rights he is about to
establish as an appropriate resolution in his culture of a long standing
dispute.
Both the judge and the law reform attorney should be conscious of
the phenomenon of horizons. When a law reformer is addressing a
judge whose horizons are narrow, he must find a way to make his
arguments comprehensible within the narrow horizons of the judge. 112
In the alternative, he must find ways to persuade the judge to cross
beyond those narrow horizons to see and understand the problems of his
client. 113 Some great appellate advocates have that skill.
As Stuart Scheingold points out, rights are resources to be used in
the political campaign for law reform. 114 The legitimacy power of
courts allows a reform campaign to rally its supporters and to attack its
opponents. When arguing before a judge, a law reform attorney may
use the legitimacy power of rights to hammer on the judge's narrow
horizons demanding that the judge respect and pay attention to his
client's rights, his client's interests and his client's standing as a

108. 98 Eng. Rep. 499.
109. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 254 referring to Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 462-63 (1930).
110. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84.
111. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 255.
112. Id. at 283-89.
113. Id.
114. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84.
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person. 115
Events in the wider world may provide society and courts with the
vital experiences necessary to abandon or cross old horizons. Not long
before the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 116 the world was
challenged by the experience of World War II and the Holocaust. In the
United States, shortly before that, we had the experience of the Great
Depression and after the war, Truman's desegregation of the military,
the beginning of the Cold War and the Korean War. All of these
experiences along with the NAACP' s extensive law reform campaign
would have contributed to the new necessary change of horizons that
made Brown v. Board of Education possible. 117 World War II, the
Holocaust, and the Cold War also were experiences that changed
European horizons and contributed to the new atmosphere which
allowed development of the EuroRean Union and the evolutionary
advance of human rights in Europe. 1 8
A law reformer, or one concerned with the advance of the rule of
law and human rights, should be conscious of the phenomenon of
horizons, of the experiences which open the opportunity for expanding
our horizons and should seek the tools necessary for hammering on
foreign horizons. Among those tools is the legitimacy power of rights
which can be used as a resource in pursuing further goals like
establishing additional or more fundamental rights.
From the perspective of a conscientious judge, consciousness of
the phenomenon of horizons would be significant. A judge recognizing
his horizons, his limited knowledge and understanding, and desiring to
decide justly or perhaps having a commitment to respect and concern
for all persons should accept an additional and corollary obligation to

115. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 283-89.
116. 347 U.S. 483.
117. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 144-45.
118. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, et al., Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion
of European Union Authority Into U.S. Business Mergers and Competition Practices: U.S.
Multinational Businesses Underestimate the Strength of the European Commission from
G.E.-Honeywell to Microsoft, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 571, 573-74 (2004) ("When the Cold
War threat, hanging over Europe for decades, was eliminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, Europe was free to develop its centralized institutional structure ... "); see also
Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons from
the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 769, 823 (2004) (citing Eric S. Hochstadt, The
Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 318 (2002))
("The creation of the European Union and the Common Market itself finds much of its
foundation in rebuilding a war tom continent following the end of the Second World War
and the desire for an economic unity and interdependence, especially in the post-Cold War
era.").
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cross horizons and to develop methods for crossing horizons. 119 Social
science and social science data, despite or perhaps because of their
controversial use in Brown v. Board of Education, 120 are among the
tools for enabling a judge to cross horizons and recognize the impact of
his decisions on those in foreign horizons. A commitment to, and
methods for, crossing horizons are both a means for promoting human
rights and a topic for exploration by legal philosophers and social
scientists. 121
The process of developing and establishing rights then should be
perceived and studied in relation to the problem of horizons, the
possibility of crossing horizons and the means for doing that. 122
Lawyers, legal philosophers and social scientists can study the problems
from various points of view.
Accordingly, lawyers and legal
philosophers should be conscious of horizons and should seek to create
tools for crossing them from the point of view of the judge and the point
of view of an advocate for the disadvantaged. 123
The advance of rights, perhaps with the help of horizon crossing
techniques, is related in turn to the advance of the rule of law and to the
legitimacy of new governmental arrangements perhaps regional unions.
To the extent that rights are secured and recognized within a horizon,
people are encouraged to take their disputes to court, to settle them
peacefully, to sue government officials or entities who are subject to the
rule of law rather than starting revolutions or campaigns of terrorism. A
law reform campaign seeking the establishment of new rights is a
substitute for revolution. That campaign can take place within a
particular country, within a regional organization, such as the newly
developed structures in Europe, or hopefully on a global scale in the
future. The availability and regular use of the process of law reform to
establish rights should contribute to the legitimacy and stability of
governments and regional organizations. The regular use of law reform
campaigns should contribute to strengthening and expanding the rule of
law.
For that purpose it helps to understand rights not simply as rules or
entitlements but as tools, perhaps as language tools for the
accomplishment of human purposes. In my book, A Personalist
Jurisprudence, The Next Step, I describe a number of different uses of

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 86-87.
347 U.S. 483.

See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 294.
Id.
Id. at 260.
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the language of rights. Rights may be perceived as remedies or
predictions that a court may afford a remedy, as conclusions drawn
within a system of rules by way of a judicial decision, by arguments for
that decision, or criticisms of it, as reasons for that decision, as
particularly powerful reasons which will trump competing reasons, as
goals to be pursued, or as resources for pursuing those goals. 124
V. NATURALLAW
In the first volume of his A History of the English-Speaking
Peoples, 125 Winston Churchill discussing the Magna Carta explained:

If the thirteenth century magnates understood little and
cared less for popular liberties or Parliamentary democracy,
they had all the same laid hold of a principle which was to
be of prime importance for the future development of
English society and English institutions. Throughout the
document it is implied that here is a law which is above the
King and which even he must not break. The reaffirmation
of a supreme law and its expression in a general charter is
the great work of Magna Carta; and this alone justifies the
respect in which men have held it. The reign of Henry II,
according to the most respected authorities, initiates the rule
of law. But the work as yet was incomplete: the Crown was
still above the law; the legal system which Henry had
created could become, as John showed, an instrument of
oppression.
Now for the first time the King himself is bound by the
law. The root principle was destined to survive across the
generations and rise paramount long after the feudal
background of 1215 had faded in the past. The Charter
became in the process of time an enduring witness that the
power of the Crown was not absolute. 126
In this passage Winston Churchill sketches some major steps in the
establishment of the rule of law.
Most importantly, the
institutionalization of a higher law, accomplished through the Magna

124. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 255-59.
125. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE
BIRTH OF BRITAIN 256-57 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1956).
126. Id.
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Carta, subjects the king to the rule of law. When the government is
subject to the rule of law, we have a strong foundation for the
development of civil liberties and the advance of human rights. The
institutionalization of higher law for this purpose is in the main stream
of the natural law tradition.
Natural law in its many incarnations over the ages .has served as a
vast storehouse of resources for the advance of the rule of law. 127 The
Romans borrowed the notion of natural law from Greek philosophers,
particularly the Stoics, and used it to mold the law necessary to govern
their vast empire. 128 As their empire grew, the Romans confronted a
problem not entirely dissimilar to the current world situation. For the
sake of commerce, good order and justice the Romans required an
international law, a law of nations, a }us gen tium, as they described it.
That }us gentium should not be the law of a particular state including
their own. Rather they drew on the themes common to many laws to
create a higher law. The labors of the great Roman jurists, in
developing the }us gentium and the }us naturalis, were ultimately
codified by the Emperor Justinian in his famous Codex which has
served to advance the rule of law over the ages. 129
Medieval natural law, 130 as Churchill explained, influenced the
Magna Carta distinctively, jump-starting the history of English civil
liberties. The tradition, which began with the Magna Carta, supported
by the natural rights philosophy of John Locke, provided a foundation
for the overthrow of the Stuart kings and their pretensions to
absolutism. 131 About the same time, the great seventeenth century

127. See, e.g., ALESSANDER PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Hutchinson Univ. Library 1951); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province Trans., Benziger Bros. 1947);
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLIC; HUGO GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625);
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1682); JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAGUI,
PRINCIPLES DU DROIT NATUREL (1747).
128. See D'ENTREVES, supra note 127.
129. Judge Albert Rosenblatt of the New York Court of Appeals states: "At its height,
the Roman Empire ruled over much of the known world. It is a tribute to the Roman sense
of pragmatism that they were able, with almost scientific ability, to craft laws of such
universality as to seem part of the natural order of things. As a model rule of law for all
Western society, culminating in the Justinian Code of the sixth century, the articulation of
law by Rome, must be counted as a giant stride in the history of law on this planet." See
Albert M. Rosenblatt, The Fifty-Fifth Annual Cardozo Memorial Lecture: The Laws
Evolution: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2133-34 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Aquinas, supra note 127, at 505-06.
131. Cf Edward S. Corwin, Establishment ofJudicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 10, 104
(1910).
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natural lawyers, Grotius 132 and Pufendorf, 133 whom Dr. Schwartz
admires greatly, were using the resources of the natural law tradition to
form the foundations of modem international law, 134 a distinct advance
in establishing a world rule of law.
Thomas Jefferson, in the next century, drew on John Locke's
natural rights theory to lay, in the Declaration of Independence, the
foundation for development of the American tradition of human and
civil rights. 135 In tum, the American tradition made perhaps the most
significant contribution to the modem worldwide advance of human
rights.
The notion of a higher law, whatever its foundation, is the essential
contribution of the natural law tradition to the advance of the rule of law
and the promotion of human rights. 136 In the absence of positive law, a
}us gentium or modem international law can be developed on the
foundation of that higher law. Under the authority of that higher law,
kings and governments can be subjected to the rule of law and their

132. See GROTIUS, supra note 127, at 38-39.
133. See PUFENDORF, supra note 127.
134. See Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered
Women's Right to Self-Defense, 71 CHI. L. REv. 1749 (2004). Prior to the adoption of the
United Nations Charter, the concept of }us ad bellum--or a just use of force or recourse to
war-had developed over several thousand years. This theory was the product of early
Greek philosophers such as Aquinas and secular theorist of just war such as Grotius
developed this concept through analogy and reference to an individual's right to selfdefense. Id.
135. Locke stated that "men formed society primarily to secure their natural rights of
life, liberty, and property."
See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 42 (2002). Jefferson's first
See
draft of the Declaration of Independence copied Locke's trinity verbatim.
MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY 269 (Frank N . Magill ed., Harper Collins 1990).
However, the Declaration final draft read, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men ... " See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (1776).
136. Cicero argued: "True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands and
averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay it commands or prohibitions
upon good men in vain, though, neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to
alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to
abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and need
not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be
one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its
promulgator, and its enforcing judge." See CICERO, THE REPUBLIC THE LAWS 68-69 (Niall
Rudd trans., 1998).
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citizens' civil and human rights can be protected against those ruling
powers. That protection of citizens and control of rulers, however, as
we examine our history, has been promoted best by the
institutionalization of that higher law. To mention some instances, that
institutionalization of higher law is represented by the Magna Carta, 137
by the British Bill of Rights of 1688, 138 by the American Constitution
and its own Bill of Rights 139 as administered by our Supreme Court, by
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 140 by the Covenants
on Civil and Political Rights, 141 and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 142 by the European Union, 143 by the European Convention on
Human Rights, 144 by the European Court of Human Rights. 145
From that history clues can be derived for advancing the rule of
law and the protection of human rights in our modem world. Our
developing international law could serve as the higher law which could
subject otherwise unrestrained rulers to the rule of law and respect for
the human rights of their citizens. 146 There is some indication in the
flow of current events that this process is beginning. 147 It is necessary,
however, to institutionalize that process probably through the United
Nations and regional organizations modeled on the European Union.
The set of related concepts offered in this paper and discussed
above in Parts II through V may be helpful to understanding the relation
between a higher law perhaps derived from natural law, the institutions
which apply that higher law and the evolutionary development of the
rule of law and the related advance of human rights. Those concepts
include the rule of law; the language and uses of rights; primary social

137. See generally MAGNA CARTA (1215).
138. See generally BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1689).
139. See generally U.S. CONST.
140. See Universal Declaration, supra note 47.
141. See ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
142. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 .
. 143. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 311.L.M. 253.
144. See European Convention 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
145. This court was created in Article 19 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. See id. art. 19.
,
146. See David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 231, 233
(2002). "Beginning with the Holocaust, the international community began to treat genocide
as criminal under international law, rather than excusing it as an unfortunate (but necessary)
incident to state sovereignty." Id.
147. Id. at 234. This process began with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following
the Second World War. More currently this is demonstrated by war crimes tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 235.
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goods; legitimacy; horizons; crossing horizons; point of view analysis;
and the use of rights as tools in the process of social change.
As just explained, the institutionalization of natural law or higher
law can be used to subject rulers to the rule of law. That advance of the
rule of law in turn creates respect for the rights of citizens. While a
government controlled by an uncommanded sovereign may exercise
legitimacy power, it will also suffer legitimacy costs. 148 When the
government is subject to the rule of law and respects the rights of
citizens, those legitimacy costs are reduced. There is a desirable
relation then between legitimacy, the rule of law, and respect for rights.
Institutionalization of a higher law will advance the rule of law, respect
for rights and, ultimately, legitimacy.
To be successful, however, an institutionalization of a higher law
must be perceived as legitimate or must acquire legitimacy. This new
regime of rules, as H.L.A. Hart points out, must be accepted by the
people 149-that is the challenge that confronts a new regional
international organization, a new international court, or new efforts by
the United Nations or world powers to enforce the rule of law in defiant
Third World countries. The successful exercise of that international
power to advance the rule of both law and human rights will enhance
the legitimacy power and acceptance of the new organization. Initially
and throughout its development, the new international organization will
Successful horizon crossing
confront the problem of horizons.
techniques will contribute to its success.
From the earlier discussions, however, a number of other
suggestions can be derived for enhancing the legitimacy and
acceptability of a new international organization or a new exercise of its
power. The world powers seeking perhaps through pressure or invasion
to subject rulers of particular countries to the world rule of law should
themselves be subject to the rule of law. A powerful country, France,
Britain, or the United States will exercise greater legitimacy power if its
enforcement activities are conducted through or are authorized by the
United Nations or by a regional union, for example the European Union.
The development of additional regional unions would be desirable. The
exercise of power in the international realm, without the cloak of
legitimacy, will suffer legitimacy costs and hypothetically will be more
difficult and less enduring. Repeated successful enforcement of the rule
of law, with legitimate authorization, in contrast, should enhance the
148. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 244-46.
149. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 114-20 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) noted in
DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 233.
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world rule of law and its legitimacy power-that in tum, by subjecting
rulers to the rule of law should advance human and civil rights.
Rights themselves, as they become more widely accepted, become
tools in the campaign to expand rights but also to advance the rule of
law. Rights may be used in this campaign simply as a particularly
effective form of rhetoric. 150 They can be used and are currently used in
third world countries, and the United States, to hammer on foreign
horizons, calling attention to oppression and persons who are oppressed.
If forums, particularly but not exclusively courts, are available for
asserting rights, then rights litigation will be more effective. Rights
litigation then will become an important tool for gradual advancement
of the rule of law and human and civil liberties. Such courts could be
world courts but perhaps more usefully and effectively regional courts
or even courts within particular countries. The incorporation of the
European Covenant on Human Rights into the domestic law of
particular European countries was a positive advance which should
allow more effective law reform litigation.
The United Nations, world powers, international or regional courts
all should be conscious of the problem of horizons when seeking to
advance or enforce human rights and the rule of law. Horizons are
expanding gradually, for example, by repeated, sensitive and successful
rights litigation. Gradual development of rights and the rule of law
accompanied by repeated understanding and crossing of horizons will
support the legitimacy of the rule of law and the new regime of rights.
There is a linkage between the rule of law, the advance of rights, the use
of rights to hammer on foreign horizons, the understanding of rights
within those foreign horizons, the crossing of horizons, the use of rights
in the process of social change and legitimacy. The rule of law provides
legitimacy for rights litigation and reform. In tum, rights litigation
provides legitimacy for the rule of law. That legitimacy is enhanced,
and legitimacy costs are reduced if courts and others enforcing rights
and the rule of law understand horizons and are committed to crossing
horizons.
Legitimacy, of course, is linked also to protection of the primary
social goods, those goods necessary to participation in any society or
this society. The importance of assuring security and economic wellbeing to legitimacy is clear from recent experience. The great rights are
those which protect each person's share of the primary social goods,
each person's life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Advance of the

150. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 38, at 83-84.
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great rights also advances the rule of law and legitimacy, the
acceptability and the conditions for acceptance of the regime of law.
The interdependence of these concepts, legitimacy, rights, primary
social goods, the rule of law, horizons and so on, could be described as
an aspect of the functioning of natural law. From experience, including
the experience of lawyers, judges and rights litigators, they are also vital
concepts and tools in the institutionalization of natural law, a higher
law, the rule of law. I submit that this process can be studied from the
perspective of lawyers and legal philosophers and the perspective of
social scientists. What should be studied is the use of tools of law and
government in the process of social change, the advance of human
liberties and the rule of law. We are accumulating examples both
within countries and in the international arena of that process of social
change.
St. Paul once described what has come to be called the natural law
as written in the hearts of human persons. 151 As a scripture scholar Paul
was drawing on a thousand years of learning in the tradition descended
from Abraham, which many of us hold in common. A reasonable
interpretation of that could be put as follows.
In the course of human interaction and experience we gradually
come to understand our fellow human beings as persons who share
human feelings, desires, sufferings, and moral struggles. 152 Out of that
understanding, grow respect and concern for others, for many others.
That respect and concern can be contemplated philosophically, be
generalized, be transformed into individual and community
commitments, be institutionalized into the rule of law, great ideals,
respect for rights, the importance of courts and of rights litigation and
reform. It is a gradual process, a process of continual development of
human experience, influenced by vital and sometimes traumatic
experience, by World Wars, by the abolition of slavery, by the
Holocaust, by the successful establishment of regimes of rights such as
the European Union. An important part of natural law as so understood
is the process of social change and the role of human experience and
ideals in that process of social change.
Natural law then is not a set of propositions or even ideals
151. Romans 2:14-16. ("Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature
things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the
law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their
consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending
them ... This will take place on the day when God will judge men's secrets through Jesus
Christ, as my gospel declares.") Id.
152. See DONNELLY, supra note 7, at 233-38.
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important as they are to natural law but a process of human experience
by which our regard for our fellow human beings grows, is generalized
into ideals and commitments, is institutionalized and regularly changed,
as by crossing horizons and gathering the experience of life, our
understanding and regard for our fellow human persons deepens and
broadens. Honoring Dr. Richard Schwartz's interest in natural law and
his great work in law and social science, I submit that this process
particularly as it is represented by institutionalized social change can be
studied by lawyers, legal philosophers and social scientists.
CONCLUSION

A central theme of this paper is that a desirable relation exists
between legitimacy, the rule of law and respect for rights. I argue that
there is a reciprocal relation between the rule of law and respect for
rights. To the extent that a government is subject to the rule of law, the
human and civil rights of its citizens are advanced. In tum, as citizens
with confidence bring disputes concerning violation of their rights to the
courts, rather than seeking remedies in the streets, the rule of law is
enhanced. Both respect for rights and the rule of law are likely to make
governments more acceptable to their citizens and hence more
legitimate. Effective establishment of the rule of law and respect for
rights will enhance everyone's share of the primary social goods and
consequent ability to participate in society. A basic requirement of
legitimacy is that a government ought to protect and enhance everyone's
basic share of the primary social goods. Understanding and crossing
horizons allows courts, rulers and law reform litigators to understand
rights and basic interests, i.e., primary social goods, in the context of
foreign horizons. Consequently, understanding and crossing horizons
increases the likelihood that citizens will feel respected and will in tum
respect the rule of law. Rights themselves should be perceived not
merely as statements of ideals or entitlements but as goals to be pursued
and as tools to be used in pursuit of those goals. Rights should be
perceived and used as tools in the context of horizons, as means for
crossing horizons, for pursuing law reform and should be understood
from various perspectives or points of view including those of a judge
and law reformer. Rights then are tools for hammering on foreign
horizons, advancing the rule of law, and enhancing the legitimacy of a
society.
From the perspective of a legal philosopher reflecting on the
history of law and social change with a view to framing tools for
lawyers and decision makers and engaged in developing judicial
decision making method, I have argued in my book, A Personalist
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Jurisprudence, The Next Step, that recognizing the interrelation between
the concepts just reviewed is remarkably helpful. In this paper, I offer a
discussion of these concepts and their relationship in honor of Dr.
Richard Schwartz and to those concerned with understanding social
change facilitated by law as a means for advancing a global rule of law
and enhancing human rights.
Whether it is possible or helpful to use these concepts and their
interrelation from the point of view of a social scientist studying law
and social change, I leave to those educated in that foreign horizon and
hence more knowledgeable than me.
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